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Summary findings
Local  content programs-especially  in the auto  programs  started in 1948 and began  to wind down only
industry-accompanied many import substitution  in 1985.  Australia's  strongly  counter-competitive
policies  during  the 1960s and 1970s,  but most were  programs-the  administering  authority  was effectively
abandoned  in countries  that liberalized  trade in the  cartellizing  the industry-led to market  fragmentation,
t980s and early 1990s.  The high economic  costs of these  high costs  and prices,  and lower national  income.  They
programs  and their inherent incompatibility  with open,  retarded rather than promoted technical  change  and
nondiscriminatory  international  trade were recognized  in  reduced  rather than increased  employment  in auto
the Uruguay  Round Agreement  on Trade-Related  production, distribution,  and repair. Export
Investment  Measures  (the TRIMS  agreement),  which  requirements  increased  the scheme's  economic  costs,
required  developing  countries  to phase  them out over  which  involved  bureaucratic  micromanagement  of the
five  years. Despite  this, a number  of developing  countries  industry  and high  transaction  costs  for the government
have introduced  new local content programs  and are  and the private  sector. Once the schemes  were
currently  pressing  to relax the TRIMS  rules and to  established,  they were very  difficult  to remove  owing  to
extend the year 2000 phaseout deadline.  their populist  appeal,  their lack of transparency,  and the
A leader in this effort at the World Trade Organization  vested  interests  of the international  and domestic  firms
(WTO) is India, which in 1995 introduced  an  which  relied on them, as well as other interest groups
"indigenisation"  program for its auto industry  that  including  the administering  bureaucracies,  auto industry
typifies  similar  programs  in other developing  countries,  trade unions,  and politicians  in electorate  areas  in which
Under  India's program,  permission  to import auto  car production  was concentrated.
components  for assembly  is contingent  on agreements  to  The Australian  experience,  and similar  experiences  of
reach  specified  levels  of "indigenisation,"  plus enough  developing  countries  with these  programs  during  the
commitments  to export cars or components  to cover the  1960s and 1970s,  suggest  that they do not serve the
foreign  exchange  cost of imported  components.  The  economic  interests  of India and the other developing
system  is implemented  by a de facto ban on the import of  countries  which  are presently  seeking  to legitimize  them
built-up  cars,  and import licensing  of car components.  at the WTO. On the contrary,  the present  TRIMS
The United  States  and the European  Union  challenged  agreement  is a useful  external  counterweight  to the
the system  as a violation  of the TRIMS  agreement.  Since  influence  of domestic  lobbies  and populist  arguments,
1996, similar  arrangements  in Brazil,  Indonesia,  Mexico,  which  in Australia  and elsewhere  have  made local
and the Philippines  have been the subject  of WTO  content schemes  politically  difficult  to oppose,  and once
disputes.  established,  even more difficult  to remove.
Australia  has a long, well-documented  history  of local
content programs  in the auto industry.  Australia's
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Summary findings
Local  content  programs,  especially  in  the  auto  industry,  accompanied  the  import
substitution policies of many developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s, but most
were abandoned in the countries that liberalized their trade regimes during the 1980s and
early  1990s.  The  high  economic  costs  of  these  programs  and  their  inherent
incompatibility with open, non-discriminatory international trade were recognized in the
Uruguay  Round  agreement  on  Trade  Related  Investment  Measures  (the  TRIMS
agreement), which  required developing countries to  phase  them  out  over  five years.
Despite  this,  a  number  of  developing  countries  have  introduced  new  local content
programs and are currently pressing to relax the TRIMS rules and for extensions to the
previously agreed phaseout deadline in 2000.
A  leader  of  this  effort  at  the  WTO  is  India,  which,  in  1995  introduced an
"indigenisation" program for its auto industry which typifies similar programs in other
developing countries. Under  this program, permission to  import  auto components for
assembly is contingent on agreements to reach specified levels of "indigenisation", plus
commitments to export cars or components sufficient to cover the foreign exchange cost
of imported components. The system is implemented by a de facto  ban on the import of
built-up cars, and import licensing of car components. It has been challenged at the WTO
by  the  US and  the EU  as  a violation of the  TRIMS agreement. Since  1996, similar
arrangements in the Philippines, Mexico, Brazil  and Indonesia have been  the subject  of
WTO disputes.
Australia has a long and well documented history of local content programs in the
auto industry. The programs started in 1948 and continued for about 40 years, until they
began to be gradually wound down, starting in  1985. This experience has a number of
l* Most of the information in this note on the Australian local content and other policies in the auto industry is from
two  major  reports,  namely:  Industries  Assistance  Commission,  July  1981.  Passenger  Motor  Vehicles  and
Components-Post-1984 Assistance Arrangements, and:  Industry Commission, May 1997.The Automotive Industry.
A brief summary of these policies and some relevant documents are included in a book on the history of Australian
trade policy between 1965 and 1997 by  Snape, Gropp and Luttrell (1998). This book  also provides an excellent
account (see Chapter 2 especially) of  the broader developments in trade policies which were the background to the
motor vehicle local content story. The following commonly -used auto industry abbreviations are used throughout
the paper:
cbu=completely built up (a fully assembled car)
ckd=completely knocked down (a complete kit of all the components needed to assemble a car)
skd=semi-knocked down (a kit of car components with some missing or "deleted")
oe=original equipment (components for car assembly as distinct from replacement parts)
2lessons for developing countries. In Australia the programs led to market fragmentation
and  high  costs  and  prices,  reduced  national  income,  and  were  strongly  counter
competitive,  with  the  administering  government authority  effectively  cartellizing  the
industry. They retarded rather than promoted technical change, and reduced rather than
increased employment in auto production, distribution and repair. The addition of export
requirements increased the economic costs of the schemes, which also involved extremely
high transaction costs for the government and the private sector and bureaucratic micro-
management of the industry. Once the schemes were established, they were very difficult
to  remove  owing to  their  populist  appeal, their  lack of  transparency, and  the  vested
interests of the international and domestic firms which relied on them, as well as other
interest groups including the administering bureaucracies, auto industry trade unions, and
politicians in  electorates areas in which car production was concentrated.
The Australian experience, and similar  experiences of developing countries with
these programs during the  1960s and 1970s, suggest that they do not serve the economic
interests  of  India  and the  other developing countries which  are presently  seeking to
legitimize them at the WTO. On the contrary, the present TRIMS agreement is a useful
external  counterweight to  the  influence of  domestic  lobbies  and populist  arguments,
which in Australia and elsewhere have made local content schemes politically difficult to
oppose,  and once established, even more difficult to remove.
3Introduction
The automobile industry worldwide is technology intensive both  as regards its
processes and its products and  is characterized by considerable economies of scale and  a
high degree of specialization in component manufacture. Largely for these reasons, the
world industry has  increasingly become internationalized, with component  production
for individual models located in  many countries  and assembly concentrated in  large
domestic markets or in countries which are a base for regional exports. At the same time,
consumers demand a large variety of models, and for these to be supplied at competitive
prices  imports of cars account for large shares of the total supply even in the  largest
national markets, including the markets of the United States and the EU. Despite this,
economic nationalism and the belief that the car industry is a transmitter par  excellence of
the latest industrial technologies  has led many countries at some stage of their recent
economic history  to  attempt to  become fully  or predominantly  self  sufficient  in  car
production. In pursuit of this  goal, they have attempted to persuade international auto
firms to establish domestic production in replacement of car imports. The most direct and
widely used means of doing so has been to impose quantitative controls over car imports
while at the same time offering the international car firms opportunities to establish local
factories, subject to the condition that they go beyond assembly of  imported ckd packs
and incorporate specified levels of "local content" in the form of domestically produced
components, either produced in-house or purchased from domestic suppliers.
In  many  countries,  including  especially  the  developing  countries  of  Latin
America2, it eventually became apparent that these policies not only involved  very high
economic costs to consumers , government budgets and to the economy generally, but on
balance were retarding  rather than advancing  indigenous technological  capabilities.
Recognizing this, as part of the general liberalization of trade and other policies which
began during the  1980s, the QRs applied to car imports and the associated local content
programs were either abolished or more commonly gradually phased out. The general
consensus -supported by many empirical studies-on  the economic inefficiency of these
arrangements,  combined  with  their  inherent  incompatibility  with  open,  non-
discriminatory international trade, were reflected in the Uruguay Round agreement on
Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)3. Under this agreement, which applies to
all  industries (not just  the  auto industry) and is binding on  all members of WTO, all
existing TRIMS were to  be notified to the WTO and (beginning on January  1, 1995)
2  Local content programs in the auto industries of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina are discussed and analysed in a
paper by  Bernard Munk (1969). An analysis of  an  auto local content  program in the  Philippines is in Takaks
(1994), which  also provides  other references on content protection. Like  all serious economic analyses of  local
content programs, these papers shows that local content programs are welfare decreasing. It can also be shown that
the extension of these programs to give local content credit for exports (as in India) will further reduce economic
welfare.
3  The text of the TRIMS agreement together with the legal texts of the GATT and other WTO agreements, is in
World Trade Organization (1995), and is also available from the WTO website.
4phased out over two years (developed countries) or five years (developing countries). By
imnplication,  no new TRIMS were to be applied,  except when not doing so would distort
competitive conditions between a new investment and an existing investment already
subject to a TRIM which is still operative during a transition period.
Despite this earlier consensus and despite signing the TRIMS agreement, during
the  second half of the  1990s a number of  developing countries introduced new local
content programs applicable to their domestic auto industries, and others have continued
to  implement local content programs that were supposed to  expire in  the  year 2000.
These actions are clearly inconsistent with both the spirit and the letter of the agreement,
and the programs in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines triggered consultation
requests  at  the  WTO  on  the  part  of the  EU, the  US  and  Japan. But  at the  Seattle
Ministerial, led by India, a group of 12 developing countries effectively resurrected the
original  1960s infant  industry justifications  for these  programs  by  arguing  that  they
"allow for accelerating the industrialization process in developing countries and enable
these  countries  to  maintain  balance-of-payments  stability",  and  that  the  TRIMS
agreement should therefore be amended to extend the transition time for their expiry in
developing countries "until  such time that their  development needs demand".4 Since
Seattle, these and other developing countries have continued to push for extensions to the
previously agreed 2000 deadline, 5 and also for relaxation of the present TRIMS rules.
One of the most active countries in this effort at the WTO is India, and it has also been
implemer.ting very comprehensive local content (called "indigenisation") policies for its
auto industry. India's policies are briefly outlined below, since they typify the kinds of
interventions in  this  industry which  a number of  other developing  countries are  also
following and  which  they  are  arguing  should  be  condoned  by  WTO  rules.  This  is
followed by a short  history of the long and well documented Australian experience with
aut(o  local content plans, and some of the lessons from this experience that the economic
policy communities in India and other developing countries might wish to ponder.
India's new local content ("indigenisation")  policies
As part of the liberalizing reforms of industrial and trade policies undertaken in
1991 aiid 1992, India discontinued most existing local content programs (called  " phased
manufacturing  programs" or PMPs)  and announced that they would not be applied to
4 Paras 20 and 21 of a  Communication  received by the WTO General Council  from India on behalf of  Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and
Uganda. Document (WTO/GC/W/354 11 October 1999)  available on the WTO website. At the same timne  Mexico
argued that the TRIMS agreement should be revised, and in any event for the right to extend existing agreements for
a further  Five  years in order to avoid "developmental dislocations and problems in sensitive areas of their economy"
(WTO document WT/GC/W/35 1).
5 For example, requests for extensions by nine countries-Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Romania and Thailand-were discussed at the October  16, 2000 meeting of the WTO Council for
Trade 'D Goods.
5new  projects.  Most  of  these  were  in  the  electronics, auto  component  and  chemical
industries. Despite this, soon after the Uruguay Round agreement came into effect, during
1995  the DGFT (Directorate General of Foreign Trade in the Ministry of Commerce)
started requiring "indigenisation " commitments from foreign auto firms which began
setting up joint ventures with Indian firms for car production in India. Being defined as
"consumer  goods",  for  many  years  the  import  of  cars  had  been  subject  to  inmport
licensing. As applied, for all practical purposes this was a general ban on car imports.
Since consumer goods in ckd or skd form were also subject to import licensing, DGFT
used  the  leverage  derived  from its power  to  issue  these  import  licenses, to  impose
conditions on the new joint ventures in the car industry as regards the indigenisation of
their production and as regards exports. Initially, the firms were required to  indigenise
their production up to 70 or 75 percent over a  period of 5 to 7 years. In December 1997
these requirements were  changed and each joint  venture  firm was required to  sign a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)  the essentials of which are6: (1) Import of ckd
or skd kits for "mere assembly" will not be allowed (2) New foreign majority partners
must bring  in at least $50 million of equity in the  first three  years of the project  (3)
"Indigenisation of components" of at least 50 percent must be reached by the third year of
production and 70 percent by the  fifth year of production (4) Exports 6f cars and/or auto
components are required to balance the cif value of imported ckd/skd/components during
the MOU period, starting in the third year of production (5) No further indigenisation or
export requirements once 70 percent indigenisation of components is achieved (6) The
MOUs to be monitored on the basis of annual reports submitted by the joint ventures to
DGFT (7) Manufacture of light or heavy commercial vehicles are not subject to these
requirements  : the import of ckd/skd kits is to be considered "on merits". These firm-
specific local content and export requirements operate in the  context of the following
general policies:  a general ban on  all imports of built up  cars;  discretionar',  import
licensing by DGFT of ckd and skd kits which (1999-2000) were subject to a 46.4 percent
tariff;7 import of engines free of import licensing and subject to a 33.3 percent tariff;
import of most other auto components and accessories subject to  a 46.4 percent tariff;
availability  of  advance  licenses allowing duty  free imports  of  raw  materials to  be
incorporated in exported car components, and of advance licenses for duty free import of
the components of exported built-up cars. In August  1999 India finally lost out at the
WTO in  a long running dispute in which it had resisted removing  its comprehensive
import licencing system, which it had justified for many years under the GATT balance
6  These conditions are published in the Gazette of India, 60-PN 12.12.97. The text and a  brief description of this
and other aspects of the government's  auto policies is in Arun Goel (2000), pp 866-870.
' These and the following import duty rates include the "Special Additional" (SAdd) duty of 4 percent which comes
on top of  the cumulative value of  basic customs and additional duties. They are calculated from the  customs tariff
schedule announced with the February  1999 budget e.g. in the case of  ckd/skd kits, basic duty 40%, additional
(excise tax) 16%, special additional duty 4%.
6of payments provision (Article XVIII. B) 8., and announced that it would free imports
previously restricted in this way from April 1, 2001, including the de facto ban on built up
car  imports.  Following  this  announcement,  however,  DGFT  began  planning  for
alternative  ways  of  enforcing  local  content requirements  in  the  absence  of  import
licensing.9
In  1999 the  MOUs  described above  were  being  applied to  16 passenger  car
production joint  ventures  between  domestic  firms  and  16  foreign  firms  10  which
envisaged production in India of approximately 24 models. As noted above, many other
countries have experimented with similar arrangements for their car industries in the past,
but found them to be economically extremely expensive and have given them up. One of
these countries is Australia. The details and effects of the policies it has followed have
been  especially  well  documented and  analyzed. The  Australian policies  are  first
summarized below, and then a  number of key lessons for India and other developing
countries which can be drawn from its experience are outlined.
Local content policies in Australia: a brief history
Australian  policies  aimed  at  creating  a  domestic  car  manufacturing  industry
started in the mid-1930s when extra protection against competing imports and a variety of
subsidies were offered to  induce General Motors to produce  a  local car,  the Holden.
These efforts were interrupted by World War II, but production of "Australia's own car"
finally started in 1948. From then until 1960, production of the Holden and subsequently
the production in Australia of a number of cars with substantial Australian content by
British Motors and Ford, were supported by  local content arrangements, concessional
loans and, crucially, by the way Australia's  general system of import licensing (carried
over from the war years) was applied to the car industry. In 1960, however, the general
import licensing  system was abolished and  competition from imported cars  began  to
' For many years India justified its general import licencing regime under the GATT balance of payments exception
(GATT Article XVIII.B) and was never  seriously challenged. As part of the Uruguay Round all WTO members
including India signed an Understanding that they would no longer use this Article as GATT-legal cover for QRs,
unless there  were  convincing  reasons why other methods such  as  macro-economic policies  and  exchange rate
management  would  not  equilibrate the  current  account. Despite this,  India continued  its  QR  regime,  which
amounted to an import ban on practically all consumer goods. In 1997 and  1998, however, seven  WTO members
(USA, Canada,  EU, Switzerland, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand)  complained at the WTO and in negotiations
India agreed to remove these restrictions in three phases, with the QRs applied to  the  auto sector going in the
second phase during Indian fiscal years 2000/2001 and 2001/2002. However in August  1999,  the  WTO Tribunal
found against India in a dispute between it and the US on the time when the QRs were to be removed, and following
this India announced that all remaining balance-of-payments justified QRs would be removed from April 1, 2001.
' Economic Times November 2 and 3, 2000: "New auto policy mulls entry barriers", and "DGFT yet to fmalise auto
policy draft".
10 The foreign firms are:  General Motors, Peugeot, Mercedes, Daewoo, Ford, Honda, Mitsubishi, Rover (U.K.),
Hyundai,  BMW, Suzuki, JD/Sabre,  Fiat, Amerigen (USA), Concept  Industrial  (UK), and  Toyota. Source:  The
Indian Automotive  Industry. From the  website of the  Secretariat for  Industrial Assistance,  Union Ministry  of
Industry, as of March 7, 1999.
7threaten the market shares and profitability of the established producers. In response to
intense lobbying by these producers, starting in 1965 policies were adopted which greatly
increased the level and complexity of  the protection and other forms of assistance to the
industry over the next  20 years. A central element of these policies were a  series of
"Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Plans" under which local producers were provided with
tariff concessions on imported components if they met specified levels of local content in
the cars they produced. The first of these plans required lower levels of local content for
small volume producers than for higher volume producers. This discouraged large scale
production,  however,  and  led  to  a  proliferation  of  models  and  corresponding
fragmentation of production among component suppliers. Recognizing this, in  1975 the
small volume provisions were phased out and a single local content requirement of 85
percent was introduced. Despite the tariff  concessions on imported inputs, the  import
tariff protecting the industry were not sufficient for all producers to be profitable, and it
was increased from 35 percent to 45 percent in 1966. In 1975, the industry convinced the
government that the 45 percent tariff was inadequate, and quantitative import restrictions
were introduced which restricted imported cars to a market share of 20 percent. These
import restrictions were supposed to be temporary, but in fact were extended for 13 years
until April  1988. Although import controls became the main  protective instrument, in
1978 the tariff  on imported built up cars was increased again to 57.5 percent. In 1982 an
"export facilitation" scheme was introduced. Under this scheme exports of cbu cars or of
components earned credits which enabled firms to reduce their local content below the
otherwise mandatory level of 85 percent, and  which reduced the tariffs they paid on
imported components. While this was intended to partially reverse the increasing isolation
of the Australian industry from the world auto industry, as long as the industry's  output
was still protected by import licensing, it represented a further increase in the protection
of the industry's value added i.e. in effective protection.
By  1985, after 20 years of the local content plans  and the tariff and non-tariff
measures that were needed to make them viable, the car industry had become one of the
most  highly  protected  industries  in  Australia.  On  average,  effective  protection  of
Australian manufacturing was then about 20 percent and had been consistently declining
for almost  20  years. In  the  car  industry, however, nominal protection was  about  85
percent-i.e. ex-factory prices of locally produced cars were about 85  percent above the
imported duty-free prices of imported cars. Effective protection to the value-added of the
car producers which participated in the local content plans was estimated to exceed 250
percent.  On  average,  nominal  protection  of  local  original  equipment  component
manufacturers was estimated to be about 67 percent, and effective protection to  their
value added  162 percent. Profit rates in  the  component sector  were well  above the
general level of the rest of Australian  manufacturing, but on average were considerably
lower in the producer /assembler sector , even though some large producer/assemblers
consistently  earned  very  high  profits. High  protection reflected  and  resulted in  high
production  costs  rather  than  high  profits  One  major  reason  was  that  the  system
8encouraged the fragmentation of the market and the loss of  scale economies. In  1985
approximately  380,000 cars were produced under the  local content scheme, but  this
production  was  divided  between  five  companies  operating  eight  manufacturing  and
assembly plants and producing 13 different basic car models. Small production runs by
international standards for this large number of models led to small production runs and
high costs for many local component suppliers. In addition, the penalties for not meeting
local content commitments meant that a number of components that would otherwise
have been sourced from producers in other countries were produced in Australia at very
high cost and were sold to the assemblers at correspondingly high prices.
For  at  least  20  years  economists,  Tariff  Board  and  Industry  Assistance
Commission reports and many others had warned that the policies being followed towards
the car industry would have the consequences that in fact became very apparent by the
mid-1980s. In  1985 this was finally recognized in government policies, which began a
process  of  gradually  winding  down assistance to  the  industry which  has  since  been
consistently followed. These measures have included:
- The replacement  of quantitative import controls on  imported cbu cars  by tariff
quotas which were phased out in 1992.
- In 1986, penalties for low volume production by firms participating in the  local
content scheme.
- In 1989, the abolition of the local content scheme and the setting of import tariff
rates on original equipment components at the same level as the tariff rates on cbu
cars.
- Reducing the tariff on imported cars and on components from 57.5 to 45 percent in
1988, followed by  a regular yearly reduction of  2.5 percentage points in  every
subsequent year. These reductions stopped at when the tariff reached 15 percent in
2000, but in principle there is to be a further reduction to 10 percent in 2005.
- The introduction of retraining arrangements for labor displaced by the reforms.
As a consequence of these reforms, protection of the industry is now much lower
than in the past, although still considerably higher than the average protection of most
other Australian industries, which has also declined since 1985. In 1995 average effective
protection  of  car production for sale in  the  domestic market was  estimated to  be 31
percent, and average effective protection of auto component production for the domestic
market at 55 percent. Reduced protection levels had been made possible by lower costs
associated with a decline in the number of basic car models produced from 13 to 5, which
were produced by four assemblers operating four plants. In 1996 average model and plant
volumes had about doubled by comparison with  1985, and considerable rationalization
and  cost  cutting  had  occurred  in  the  component  industry. Total  car  production  was
slightly (about 15 percent ) lower, but its share of the domestic market had declined from
77 percent to  55 percent. On the other hand exports of both cars and components had
increased substantially and now account for significant shares of domestic production.
9The  Australian  attempts  to  become  self  sufficient  in  auto  production  were
extremely expensive for consumers and for the economy as a whole. In  1995, after the
local content plan had been abolished and tariffs had been reduced to 27.5 percent, the
Industry Commission estimated that the protection of the industry was equivalent to a tax
of  about $A3700 ($US2960)  on each car sold and  $A43,000 ($US 34,400) for each
person employed in the auto assembly and component sector. Using an economy -wide
general equilibrium model of the Australian economy, a simulation of reducing the auto
tariffs  from 27.5  percent  to  5 percent  estimated resulting  increases  in  real  GDP  of
between 0.4 percent and one percent. Since protection of the auto industry had been much
higher than this in the past, this suggests that the local content and other policies applied
to this industry had imposed even higher costs on consumers and the economy for many
years. A number of lessons of this costly Australian experience are worth noting.
Lessons from the Australian experience
Firstly,  restricting  car  imports  and  attempting  to  force  self  sufficiency  in
production through  local  content programs  is  likely to  lead  to  a  fragmented market
structure with a large number of models, most of which are produced at low volumes. In
1980 in Australia, the five major auto firms subject to the local content plan (GM, Ford,
Mitsubishi, Nissan and Toyota) produced  14 different models which had annual sales
ranging from 1392 to 68,204. On the fringes of the industry 3 firms (Leyland, Renault and
Volvo) not subject to the local content plan assembled five models at very low volumes
averaging about  1700 per  model. The balance of supply was imported under a  quota
equivalent to 20 percent of the market, but these imports were subject to a 57.5 percent
tariff  and could be sold at prices which on average were approximately 85 percent above
their cif prices. Without exception, all the locally produced and assembled models were
produced at scales that were far less than the  levels required to  exhaust economies of
scale in the various processes, including especially engine, transmission, and body panel
manufacture.
Secondly,  especially  at  low  volumes,  as  local  content  rises  the  cost  of  the
components which must be produced locally to meet these requirements also rises. In
1980 Toyota produced about 20,000 of their Corolla model. In evidence presented to the
Industries  Assistance  Commission, they  estimated  that  their  estimated  'duty  needs'
against a comparable import increased in the following way as local content increased.
The local content is shown first as it was defined in Australia ( which includes assembly
and marketing  in  local content)  and then as  an approximation of  the  current Indian
definition (which refers to the local content of components only 1 1).
"  It  is assumed here  that  assembly and marketing costs are 25  percent of  the ex-factory price of  the car.  The
Australian definition of local content was the ex-factory price minus the cif value of  imported components. The
Indian definition is not clear, but appears to mean the share of local components in total component cost. 60 percent
10Local  content,  Australian  37  60  70  75  80  85
definition (%)
Local  content,  Indian  16  47  60  67  73  80
definition (%)
Required import tariff (%)  19  41  46  51  59  60
Toyota  also  presented  evidence  of  the  cost  disadvantage  of  producing  various
components  in Australia as compared to production costs of the same components  in
Japan. These indicated a cost disadvantage range of about 50 percent to over 500 percent.
Mitsubishi and Ford presented evidence also showing a wide ranges of cost differences,
although less marked than those indicated by Toyota. The Australian experience clearly
demonstrates the cost of indiscriminate local content rules, which require local sourcing
of  components to  meet these requirements regardless of their  production cost. In the
Australian case, these costs were then incorporated in the cost of the finished cars and
were reflected in the selling prices of the cars, so that-indirectly- the higher the cost of  a
component to  the car assembler,  the more it contributed to meeting the local content
requirement.  Depending  on  how  "indigenisation"  percentages are  defined,  the  same
perverse  incentive whereby  high  cost  components  more  easily  satisfy  indigenisation
requirements  than  low  cost  components,  is  likely  to  be  found  in  India  and  other
developing countries.
A third lesson from Australia, is that the local content and other policies which
supported it were strongly counter-competitive. Owing to the local content requirements,
many  components  suppliers had  captive markets  and their  market  power was  only
limited by the potential ability of the assemblers to  set up production in-house. For  a
number  of  years  even  this  option  was  limited  by  a  separate  Car  Component
Manufacturing  Program  which  provided  that  components  produced  by  independent
manufacturers which met a minimum specified local content (usually 85 percent) were
deemed to have  100 percent local content when used by a vehicle producer under the
plan, even though the same component produced in-house was subject to the general local
content requirement  applicable to  the producer  12. In this and various other ways  the
administering  authority ( in the Australian case the Federal Department of Business and
Consumer  Affairs13)  contributed to  the  effective  cartellization of  the  domestic  auto
industry. For example, in the 1970s the Department blocked Honda from establishing an
local content on the Australian definition is assumed to be equivalent to local components equivalent to 60-25=35
percent of the ex-factory price, which is equivalent to 35/75= 47 percent of total component cost.
12 This rule deterred in-house production, since any imported parts  for the component would reduce the  vehicle
producer's  local content as defined in the plan.
13 This department was responsible for the administration of the local content plans during the 1970s and 1980s. The
Department of Industry and Commerce was responsible for policy aspects.
11assembly plant which would have operated outside the local content plan. Decisions on
the nature of the local content rules and the details of how they were applied to individual
firms were crucial for the  profitability and survival of the auto firms,  and efforts to
influence these decisions became a major activity for their  managers. In the interests of
"fairness",  the rules were varied to take account of  the particular situations of groups of
firms or individual firms. As noted earlier, special reduced local content programs were
applied to low volume producers between 1966 and 1975, which gave them considerable
cost advantages by allowing them to import components which the larger producers were
obliged  to  buy  or  produce  domestically. These  were  replaced  by  provisions  which
allowed local content to be averaged across a number of models by individual producers.
By comparison with  new  entrants, this  gave a  decisive  advantage to  the  incumbent
producers with at least one reasonably large-volume model, as regards the introduction of
other small volume models. Later on, to  offset this  effect, special low phase-in  local
content  arrangements were  made for Toyota and Nissan  when they joined  the  local
content  program  and  commenced  production.  In  1981,  the  Industries  Assistance
Commission commented on  " efforts to  improve their competitive position  by model
rationalization and cooperative arrangements between producers" 14. Despite this, it noted
that "manufacturers are continuing to invest in separate and parallel production facilities
in what is, by international standards, already a very fragmented industry". All this was
made possible by increases in tariffs to accommodate rising industry costs, and for ten
years import quotas were applied to imported cars so as to ensure an 80 percent share of
the market to the local industry, regardless of their production costs. The import quotas
were extended to include ckd and skd packs. At first complex rules were established for
the  allocation  of  quotas,  based  primarily  on  pre-quota  imports,  but  with  numerous
exceptions. Later on the  quotas were auctioned, but the auction rules were themselves
extremely complex and became the focus of intense lobbying.
A fourth lesson from Australia, is that contrary to the objectives of the original
promoters of these schemes, they retarded rather than promoted technological change in
the auto industry. A constant complaint of the local producers was that the local content
requirements  made  it  too  expensive  for  them  to  introduce  new  components  and
production techniques  into their  local operations,  and to  enable them  to  do  so they
consistently lobbied for lower local content ratios while maintaining or tightening the
limits on the import of built-up cars. In particular, the local content programs seriously
retarded the introduction of  smaller, fuel efficient vehicles into the Australian market.  15
The industry  only began to  catch up  with the  rest of the world after policy reversed
direction in 1985, and in particular  after the local content plans were abandoned in 1989.
According to a submission to the Industries Commission by Toyota in 1996:
14Industries Assistance Commission , op.cit p.  125.
'5 Ibid p.  125.
12"The  Government's  car  policy  since  1984,  by  reducing  protection,  has  required  the  car
manufacturers to progressively reduce the gaps in their cost, quality and delivery perforrnance".16
A fifth lesson from Australia is that total employment in and associated with the
auto  industry was reduced  rather than  increased  as  a result  of the  schemes  and  the
associated policies which supported them. In  1996 total employment in automotive and
auto component manufacturing was 70,300 whereas total employment in car retailing,
repair and the sale of  auto replacement parts and tyres was 295,800, more then four times
as great.17 The Industries Commission referred to estimates of own price elasticities of
the demand for private cars in other countries, which varied from about - 0.7 to - 1.6, and
its staff gave a conservative estimate for  the Australian market of -0.5. Even using this
lower  estimate  of  the  demand  elasticity,  it  can  be  inferred  that  the  reduction  in
employment in  car dealerships, repair etc. consequent on the  increased protection and
higher  car  prices  associated with  the  local content plan,  over  time  would  have  far
exceeded any plausible estimate of the increased employment in auto assembly and auto
component production. 18
A  sixth lesson from the  Australian experience, is  that the  addition of  "export
facilitation" increased rather than reduced the economic costs of the system. Exports gave
firms credits which allowed them to reduce their local content. The benefits to them  of
marginal reductions in local content were extremely high, according to Toyota more than
five times the cif cost of the components that could now be imported. This in turn meant
that it became worthwhile to export at prices which were far below production costs. In
1981 the Industries Assistance Commission pointed out:
"...There would be little rationale for export facilitation without the inward-looking orientation
and  high  marginal  assistance  associated with  high  local  content  provisions..  .Export  facilitation  will
increase government direction and control of the industry and  add to what is already a  complex and
administratively  costly  assistance  package..  .There  would  be  little  gain  in  predicating  longer  term
restructuring of automotive production on the development of high cost exports which would require
continuing high subsidy".19
A  seventh  lesson  from  Australia  is that  the  transaction  costs  associated  with
schemes of  this kind  are likely to be extremely high, both for the government bodies
involved in the formulation of policy and administering the schemes, and for the auto and
component producers and the many other participants in the automobile market. Defining
'6Submission  by Toyota  quoted  in Industry Commission, 1997,  op. cit, p. 232.
17 In 1979 employment  in auto and auto component  manufacturing  was 62,368 while employment  in  motor
dealerships  and tyre retailing  alone  was 165,700.
1s In 1979,  when domestic  car prices were about 85 percent above world  prices, a cut in protection  to 20 percent
would  have been equivalent  to a reduction  in car prices  of about 35 percent,  and with  a demand  elasticity  of -0.5 an
increase in annual final car demand  of 17.5 percent.  Over a moderate  time span-say  five years-the employment
effects from selling more new cars and servicing  a larger  total stock of cars quickly begins  to exceed plausible
reductions  in employment  in car and  component  production.
'9  Industries Assistance Commission,  1981 op.cit., p.128. Despite the opposition of the Commission,  "export
facilitation"  was continued by the government  and is one element  of the early policy package that still exists.
However it lost much of its impact after the local content plan was abolished and subsequently  as tariffs were
reduced.
13and administering  local content requirements involved the Department of  Business and
Consumer Affairs in a great deal of micro-management of the industry and on its own
was extremely time and resource intensive. To illustrate, it included:
- Examination of the detailed cost and sales records of each producer
- Frequent changes to accommodate low volume and new producers
- Setting and administering local content conditions for component production
- Adjusting local content requirements to allow for exchange rate appreciations
which affected the various producers in different ways.20
- Setting and  administering rules on  "component  reversion"  i.e.  requests  for
producers to switch from local sourcing to importing particular components
- Oversight over the prices  charged by  component suppliers to  assemblers to
ensure that "local content" was not artificially inflated.
- Oversight over the import prices of components to ensure that the assemblers
were  not  underinvoicing  imported  inputs  to  help  meet  local  content
requirements.
- Setting the rules and administering the "export facilitation" policies adopted in
1979.21
- Extending the general auto industry controls to  car " derivatives" (e.g. panel
vans and small buses using the same engines and other major components as
cars) and to four  wheel drive vehicles. These were initially not subject to local
content and related policies, and the import tariffs applied to them were lower
than  car tariffs. As a result, their prices  relative to  car prices  declined  and
consumers began to substitute them for cars, and to limit this they also came
under various controls.
Over the entire history of the local content plans, there were continuing conflicts
between the auto producers, the component producers, the trade unions  and many other
groups with  an interest in the industry and the policies which affected it. These were
heard and reported on at length in numerous sessions of the Australian Tariff Board and
its successor organizations. 2 2 Between 1965 and  1996 there were eight major hearings
and reports, most of which went on for more than a year and involved evidence presented
by  dozens  of  interested groups. For  example, the  July  1981 report  of  the  Industries
Assistance Commission started in March 1979 and considered evidence presented by 90
different parties, including assemblers, component producers, importers, auto distributors,
20 In particular, the Japanese producers requested and received special treatment to offset the reduction in their local
content ratios that resulted from appreciation of the Yen.
21  These rules were extremely complex and changed frequently. For example, they initially earned local content
credits based on the gross value of exports, but this was soon changed to the net foreign exchange earnings from
exports after deducting the cost of  imported components. But this concept was further refined to deal with local
components which themselves -at first, second or even further remove-used imported components or materials.
22  The Tariff Board mutated  over time.  In  1973 it became the Industries Assistance Commission, in 1989  the
Industry Commission, and in 1998 the Productivity Commission. The changing names represent significant changes
of  emphasis  and  coverage,  from  tariffs  and  industrial protection  in the  beginning  to  policies  for  enhancing
productivity and efficiency across all industries (including service industries) in the end.
14raw material suppliers, trade unions, trade associations, professional associations, state
governments, municipalities and many others.  Special ad hoc bodies were also set up to
provide advice on auto industry policies e.g. the Car Industry Council in  1983, and the
Automotive Industry Authority in 1985. In response to these continuous pressures, there
was not a year after 1965 in which significant changes were not made in the local content
rules themselves or in the tariff and other policies which supported the system. Looking
back, it is apparent that, over many years, a great deal of talent, intellectual energy and
administrative and managerial resources-not least  in the private sector -were wasted in
first creating  and building up  this  economically  costly edifice, and  subsequently in
devising  ways  of  withdrawing  from  it  that  were  politically  acceptable  and
administratively feasible.
A  final  lesson  from the  Australian  experience  is that  once  the  local  content
programs  became  established and  major  automobile producers,  component  suppliers,
trade unions  and other groups came to rely on them, it became extremely difficult to
remove them. As noted already, detailed critiques by economists and others were already
being  made  and were well  known in  the  1960s, and  by  the  early  1970s these  were
consistently reflected in reports on the industry by the Industries Assistance Commission
and  in  numerous  press  articles. Despite  all  this,  the  system  had  generated  its  own
momentum and it steadily became more protective  and economically  costly. In  1985
policy finally reversed course and protection began to be wound down, but it took  13
years of sustained effort to reduce it to the present much lower level, which even in 2001
is still well above the levels found in nearly all other major Australian industries.
There are various  explanations for the ability of the auto industry to sustain the
political  support  for its special treatment over such  a long period.  One has  been the
populist appeal of high national content in a such a well known and visible consumer
product. A second was the distinctly non-transparent nature of the protection resulting
from the local content programs. A third was the development of a strong vested interest
in  the  continuation  of  the  system  by  the  government  officials  responsible  for  its
administration. A fourth was the determined lobbying of the local businessmen and the
large international firms allied with them, which entrenched  themselves in the Australian
market behind the protection of the local content programs. The international auto firms
had ample resources which they used to influence  the two principal Australian political
parties at both the Federal and state level. General Motors, which had a  history of support
from local content programs going back to the mid 1930s, had a key role in this regard.
Fifth,  the  industry's  work  force  was  unionized  and  influential.  Sixth,  most  of  the
investment  and  employment  in  the  manufacturing side  of  the  industry  came to  be
concentrated in a few places , in  Melbourne and the nearby town Geelong, and in the
outskirts of Adelaide. Even  as late as  1996, the Victorian  and South Australian state
governments,  the  municipalities  in  which  the  major  auto  plants  are  located,  and
politicians from these places were still lobbying strongly against  further reductions in
protection. By contrast the consumer and general national interest in lower car prices and
15a more efficient industry was diffuse and difficult to mobilize.23 All of these political
economy reasons for the staying power of the structures which the local content plans and
their  associated  supporting  policies  established,  are  likely  to  be  important  in  other
countries which start along similar paths to those traversed in Australia.
What should be done in India and other developing countries?
The  local  content  and other  aspects  of the  new  auto policies  currently  being
implemented  in  India  and  other  developing countries have  obvious similarities  with
Australia's  past local content policies, and with equally or more expensive, but mostly
now abandoned local content policies that were followed as part of the import substitution
regimes of many developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s. The Indian market for
cars is  currently about the  same size ( production of 411,000 cars  in  1996/97 versus
490,000 in Australia in 1996) and the potential for costly fragmentation is very great, with
more than 20 domestically produced models being planned under the MOUs versus five
models in Australia. The new policies also involve considerable potential for detailed,
complex,  ad  hoc,  and  non-transparent government  intervention in  the  industry.  It  is
perhaps not surprising that they have been initiated and are being administered by DGFT
in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry with the support of SIA (the Secretariat for
Industrial Assistance). In their previous incarnations these two bureaucracies, then known
as CCI&E and DGTD24, were central to the old "license raj"  regime for the  industrial
sector that was cut back by India's liberalizing reforms in 1991 and 1992.
The expensive and economically damaging record of auto local content policies in
Australia suggests that the present efforts of a number of developing countries at the
WTO  to  legitimize  or  indefinitely extend TRIMS arrangements are  not  in their  own
economic interests, and that countries such as India that are operating such policies would
be better off by reversing  course and moving  towards open, tariff based import policies
for their auto industries25. But the Australian experience also shows the strength of the
23 After losing out for 13 years, the forces supporting special treatment of the auto industry had a victory in 1997. In
a report that year, the Industry  Commission recommended that the tariff reductions should continue until the tariff
reached 5 percent in 2005,  but the government rejected this recommendation. Instead, it decided that the  reductions
would stop in 2000 at 15 percent, with a provision that there would be a further reduction to 10 percent in 2005.
24 CCI&E stands for Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, which administered the pre-reform import licencing
system. During  the  1991/92 reforms  its name was changed to  Directorate General of Foreign  Trade. Its  main
responsibility  is the  administration of  India's  remaining QRs and of  the  special import licences and  incentive
schemes for exporters. DGTD stands for Directorate General of Technical Development; under the  pre-reform
regime  it was responsible  for the now-abolished system of  industrial licencing and also  had  a key  role  in the
administration of import licencing. The function of the Secretariat of Industrial Assistance  in the reformed regime
is to promote rather then restrict industrial investment, but as part of that it is still  responsible for approving and
issuing licenses for new investments, including especially new investments by foreign firms.
25 Preferably low or moderate tariffs over which at least some import competition is possible. Very  high tariffs that
prevent all imports have the same effect as an import ban, and  if used  in conjunction with tariff reductions for
specified importers satisfying conditions such as local content targets,  effectively operate in the the same way as an
import licencing system.
16nationalist and protectionist instincts into which these policies play, and the tenacity of
the interests that are created by the policies and which would oppose their removal. This
is already apparent in India, where there  is  is practically no  public discussion of the
economic costs  and benefits of the policies, which have been initiated  and are effectively
being managed by a nexus of the bureaucracy with the international auto firms which
have invested in India and their domestic joint venture partners and component suppliers.
Fortunately,  however,  the  international environment which  allowed these  policies to
continue in Australia and elsewhere for so many years is now very different. Specifically,
under the TRIMS agreement, all the local content arrangements in force after 2000 are in
principle GATT illegal2 6, and most will presumably be challenged and disappear fairly
soon unless the  present efforts to  extend the  phase-out dates and to  water  down the
TRIMS agreement succeed. Secondly, the new WTO regime is much less tolerant of QRs
then the pre-1995 GATT, and without QRs  it becomes somewhat more difficult-although
still quite possible-to provide incentives for, and to enforce local content rules27. These
two developments increase the hope that if there is to be protection for the auto industry,
it will rely on tariffs alone, preferably low and at the same rate for components and built
up  vehicles.  As  became  apparent  in  Australia,  because  of  its  transparency,  relative
simplicity and relative freedom from lobbying and administrative discretion, tariff-based
protection  is preferable,  and  it would be much  more  conducive to  the  economically
efficient development of this important industry in India and other developing countries.
'  The Indian auto policies appear to directly conflict with both the spirit and the letter of the TRIMS agreement  (to
the extent that a reading of  of the Indian requirements suggest that they might have been almost directly copied
from the "Illustrative List" of TRIMS that are banned!)
27 Local content programs (e.g. in Australia before 1975) can be implemented without the use of QRs by allowing
car assemblers that conform to the rules to import specified components and materials at preferential low tariffs.
Assemblers  not  conforming  to  the  rules  and  operating  outside  the  schemes  could  in  principle  still  import
components at normal import duties, but they are unlikely to be viable and to be able to compete if the value of the
benefit to the conforming assemblers is large.
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